The Investigation for Fair Trail Act 2013 ‘Suspect’


By SJ Tubrazy

Chapter 1

2. (k) ‘suspect’ means a person in respect of whom there is a suspicion that he may be involve in any schedule offence and include foreigners and group as well as organization.


Telephone company’s warrantless recording, disclosure and use of the wire communications of a person suspected of using a “blue box” to evade toll charges was a reasonable exercise of the telephone company’s authority under 2511(2)(a)(i) to protect its rights and property. U.S. v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing U.S. v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975) for delineation of minimum privilege accorded telephone company under 2511(2)(a)(i)). County Detention Center’s telephone monitoring system (attached to a single trunk line that included the telephones that served the Judicial Corridor of the detention center) recorded the telephone conversations of judges using the offices and courtroom facilities located in a separate section of the detention facility. The County never notified the judges that their calls were being recorded until it was confirmed by the jail administrator four years later when a judge began to suspect such interception. The ordinary course of law enforcement’s duties does not include recording the conversations of state judicial officers. The County’s conduct therefore was not excused by the “law enforcement exception” of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). Abraham v. County of Greenville, South Carolina, 237 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2001)(citing Amati). The ordinary course of the Police Department’s business is law enforcement, and, in the circumstances here, the detective’s use of the extension phone to listen in on the conversation of a suspect who could not have reasonably expected privacy was not inconsistent with the ordinary course of the Police Department’s business. 18 U.S.C. 2510(5)(a)(i). Kirby v. Senkowski, 141 F. Supp.2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

A search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct”); see also U.S. v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2002)

Suspect implicitly consented to the monitoring of his telephone conversations conducted on an extension telephone at the police station after a detective first dialed the number from another extension and told the person answering the phone that the suspect was on the line. In view of the circumstances, he could not have expected the calls to be private or confidential. More importantly, he believed that the detective was listening and even addressed the detective directly, mocking him. He chose to speak to his mother and girlfriend nonetheless. Kirby v. Senkowski, 141 F. Supp.2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Suspect’s words spoken into mouthpiece of phone during call from police station were oral communications as recorded by police on hidden tape recorder at the police station. That the suspect believed his conversation in Thai would not be understandable to nearby police officer was of no help to the suspect because the statute [2518(2)] protects an oral communication only if there is a justifiable expectation that the communication is “not subject to interception.” Police officer was standing three feet away. A television camera was suspended from the ceiling about eight feet from the telephone and pointed toward the phone. Siripongs v. Calderon, 35F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994).

Police Department’s use of “clone pagers” to intercept numeric transmissions to suspect’s digital display pagers pursuant to state court “pen register” order cannot be considered the use of a “pen register” within the meaning of the ECPA, but was an unauthorized interception of electronic communications under 18 U.S.C. 2511. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 1995). (“. . . the Brown holding reinforces this Court’s conclusion that for purposes of the ECPA, an “interception” must acquire data simultaneously with the transmission of the data. [A] search warrant, rather than a court order, is required to obtain access to the contents of a stored electronic communication.” The same exceptions to the warrant requirement apply to this section (2703(a)) as apply to any other warrantless search. U.S. v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).) See also U.S. v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1997).

Because of the technical difficulties of conducting a computer search in a suspect’s home (online obscenity bulletin board system), the seizure of the computers, including their content, for off-site examination, was reasonable to allow police to locate the offending files. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).

The First Circuit affirmed suppression of child pornography seized from suspect’s computer during a consent search. The consent to search was given in the context of a police search for evidence of the presence of an assault suspect who had attacked a woman in the next door apartment. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness–what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). U.S. v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999).

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